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I. THE COPENHAGEN CONNECTION
In September 1989 E. Allan Farnsworth came to Copenha-
gen to serve as an "official opponent" during the public defense
of my doctoral thesis, published that year as Consequential
Damages in Comparative Context.1 I was of course honored that
Professor Farnsworth had accepted my University's invitation
to help evaluate (and "oppose") my thesis, and I will never for-
get the way this most distinguished American Contracts
scholar, taking his turn on the podium, played his "outsider's"
part - with authority and eloquence, but also with sensitivity,
kindness and grace.
I am therefore especially honored to contribute to this vol-
ume in memory of Professor Farnsworth, and I take the oppor-
tunity to revisit the topic of consequential damages, this time
with emphasis on the Vienna Sales Convention (CISG) 2 - a rule
* Professor of Law, University of Copenhagen. The author expresses his sin-
cere appreciation to Professor Torsten Iversen, Aarhus University, Professor Peter
Mogelvang-Hansen, Copenhagen Business School, and Professor Harry Flechtner,
University of Pittsburgh, for their constructive and very helpful comments on pre-
vious drafts of this article.
1 JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY, CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN COMPARATIVE CON-
TEXT: FROM BREACH OF PROMISE TO MONETARY REMEDY IN THE AMERICAN, SCANDI-
NAVIAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CONTRACTS AND SALES (1989).
2 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671, available at http://www.cisg.
law.pace.edu/cisg/text/treaty.html [hereinafter "CISG" or "Convention"].
1
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set which has come a long way since 1989. 3 But since my CISG
message extends beyond the four corners of the Convention
text, I will lay the groundwork for that discussion by restating
some observations about consequential damages within my
original comparative context.
II. THE HADLEY PARADIGM: WHERE SHALL WE STOP?
As elucidated in Farnsworth's seminal analysis of contract
damages under American domestic law, 4 a promisor's failure to
perform may result in a reduction in the value of the promised
performance itself (moldy cheese may be worth less than fresh
cheese); this reduced value constitutes what we sometimes call
a "direct" loss. 5 In addition, such breach may result in other
loss of a more "indirect," far-reaching or consequential kind, like
lost profits6 (if the promisee cannot re-sell moldy cheese).
To compare compensation for consequential loss under
American and Scandinavian law in my 1989 thesis, my point of
departure was Hadley v. Baxendale,7 decided in England some
150 years before:
The Hadley Paradigm. The crankshaft in Miller's Gloucester mill
breaks and must be sent to Greenwich to serve as a model for a
new one. Carrier undertakes to ship the shaft but negligently de-
lays delivery. As a result, the reopening of the mill is delayed.
Miller suffers lost profits, for which he sues Carrier.8
I focused initially on this contract of carriage, this "fixed star in
the jurisprudential firmament,"9 not only because Hadley re-
mains an important precedent in Common law jurisdictions,
but also because Hadley has become a larger symbol for a recur-
3 See generally JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA:
A COMPACT GUIDE TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (2d ed. 2004). Mainly a comparison of domes-
tic laws, my thesis also contains a section on international (CISG) sales. See
LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, pt. 6.
4 See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract,
70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1970).
5 Id. at 1161.
6 LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 13; see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§ 12.9 (4th ed. 2004).
7 Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145.
8 LooKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 12.
9 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 83 (1974).
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ring contractual dilemma. Should a breaching promisor, in a
given set of circumstances, be held liable for all the conse-
quences? And if not, well, where should we stop?'0
Since Hadley was governed by English (Common) law, the
basis of Carrier's liability was the breach itself (not, as would
have been the case in Scandinavia, the Carrier's "fault")." So,
the Hadley issue was not whether Miller was entitled to dam-
ages, 12 but rather: how much should he get?
Taking one small step in Miller's direction, the judge in
Hadley acknowledged that Carrier's breach had actually caused
Miller's (indirect) loss. 13 But "just as it is wise to refuse enforce-
ment altogether of some [e.g. unreasonable or unconscionable] 14
promises, so it is wise not to go too far in enforcing those
promises which are deemed worthy of legal sanction."'1 5 And so
the judge denied Miller compensation for lost profits because
that loss lay outside the parties' "contemplation," since "in the
great multitude of cases of millers sending off broken shafts to
third persons by a carrier under ordinary circumstances, such
consequences would not in all probability have occurred; and
that these special circumstances were never communicated."16
Stare decisis?17 Perhaps, in some jurisdictions, though
losses outside the parties' contemplation in 1854 might well be
10 LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 11 (quoting L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr.,
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L. J. 52, 85 (1936-37)).
11 Since the Carrier in Hadley committed a culpable (negligent) breach, he
would also have been liable under Scandinavian law, where fault-based liability is
the general rule. See generally LoOKOFSKY, supra note 1, pt. 3; see also MADs
BRYDE ANDERSEN & JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, L~eREBOG I OBLIGATIONSRET BD I, at ch.
5.5 (2d ed. 2005).
12 Damages would compensate Miller for the reduction (direct loss) in value of
the promised performance (timely carriage). See supra text accompanying notes 4-
6.
13 The judge found that want of a new shaft was "the only cause of the stop-
page of the mill," i.e., "the loss of profits really arose from not sending down the
new shaft in proper time." Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341, 355, 156 Eng.
Rep. 145.
14 See LoOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 31-39 (regarding Scandinavian and Ameri-
can domestic law).
15 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 10, at 84.
16 Hadley, 9 Ex. at 356.
17 From stare decisis et non quieta movere (to stand by the decisions and not
disturb settled points). See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LE-
GAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (3d ed. 1996) (regarding application of this
doctrine in American law).
3
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held "contemplatable" (i.e., foreseeable and therefore compensa-
ble) in the Information Age. Indeed, since Hadley has come to
mean "all things to all men,"1 8 it would seem difficult to predict
which losses any modem judge or arbitrator - with a given "con-
sequential philosophy"' 9 - might find reasonably "foreseeable"
on a given set of consequential facts.
In Scandinavian systems, where the whole concept of prece-
dent is much more elastic, 20 no single consequential case or par-
adigm could ever reign with Hadley-like authority. To be sure,
the concept of full expectation protection in Scandinavia is tem-
pered by the doctrine of "adequate causation" (adxkvans), and
the single most important element of that doctrine translates as
"foreseeability."21 But adequate causation is itself a gaping con-
ceptual pigeonhole, 22 within which no less than eleven (11) sig-
nificant sub-conceptions reside,23  including one which
resembles what American jurists refer to as their (outmoded)
"tacit agreement" test. 24 So, as with Hadley, we might say that
the Scandinavian doctrine of adequate causation means "all
things to all [Scandinavian] men."25
Quite apart from Hadley (and Hadley-related limitations),
i.e., even when lost profits are held foreseeable (or "adequately
caused"), compensation in both American and Scandinavian ju-
risdictions might still be denied or reduced by reference to other
elastic doctrines like mitigation (the doctrine of avoidable
loss),26 and/or the even more elusive requirement of certainty
18 GILMORE, supra note 9, at 50.
19 Cf. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, at 802 (speaking of foreseeability and cer-
tainty in American law: "much depends on the particular circumstances of the case
and the judicial philosophy of the court").
20 See generally Joseph Lookofsky, Precedent and the Law in Denmark, in
PRECEDENT AND THE LAW (Ewoud Hondius ed., 2006), available at http://www.cisg.
law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofskyl5.html (regarding Danish judge-made law).
21 In Danish: pdregnelighed. See generally LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 175.
22 See id. at 176 n.453.
23 See generally TORSTEN IVERSEN, ERSTATNINGSBEREGNING I KONTRAKT-
SFORHOLD § 6.1 (2000).
24 See id. at 96 (regarding "aftalens foruds-etninger"); cf. LOOKOFSKY, supra
note 1, at 180-81; see also infra text accompanying notes 37-39 (regarding the
American version of "tacit agreement").
25 Cf. supra text accompanying note 18.
26 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 162.
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(i.e., the substantive or procedural standard applied by the
court or tribunal in the jurisdiction concerned).27
Besides discussing the American and Scandinavian ver-
sions of these omnipresent liability limiters in my thesis, I also
noted some (then) less familiar sub-issues, including aleatory
contracts and compensation for the value of "lost chance,"28 pre-
viously covered in Farnsworth's American work.29 In addition,
I sought to compare other new and controversial liability para-
digms, including limitations designed to prevent "disproportion-
ate" compensation, 30 though in Scandinavia some might view
that limitation as an old (adequate causation) sub-conception in
a new set of clothes.31
To further explain (and perhaps further complicate) the
picture, I argued that American and Scandinavian decisions
which award or deny compensation for consequential loss are
often best understood in terms of an even larger conceptual cat-
alogue, a complex motivational mixture of factors (in a "conse-
quential equation") tied to the operative facts of the particular
case. 32 In some of my case study paradigms I highlighted the
"degree" of contractual commitment, in others the presence (or
absence) of fault. I even suggested that this mixed bag of rele-
vant factors can sometimes affect the viability of purported dis-
claimers and limitations of consequential liability.
It is, I argued, easier to describe the various individual cat-
egories and factors than to explain their complex interaction in
the mind of a judge, the human expert in our "expert system." 33
We cannot de-humanize this process by translating it to pro-
27 Id. at 181; cf Djakhongir Saidov, Standards of Proving Loss and Determin-
ing the Amount of Damages, 22 J. CONT. L. 27, 51 (2006) ("the procedural/substan-
tive law distinction is not entirely clear-cut").
28 LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 182.
29 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.15 (discussion accompanying the mar-
gin heading "Impetus"; in prior editions the §12.15 head is "Recent relation of
rule").
30 See LoOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 187-95; see generally infra Part III.
31 See IVERSEN, supra note 23, at 97 (regarding "-ekvivalens mellem
vederlagets storrelse og ansvarets udstr.ekning").
32 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 217; cf FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, at 802
(speaking of certainty and foreseeability: "much depends on the particular circum-
stances of the case and the judicial philosophy of the court").
33 See LooKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 217; cf. Legal Applications of Artificial In-
telligence, available at http://www.gslis.utexas.edu/-palmquis/courses/project98/
ailaw/ailaw.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
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gramming language (artificial intelligence), 34 nor can we con-
struct a workable verbal formula which accounts for all the
relevant consequential factors, because so much is relevant, be-
cause Hadley (like adxekvans) stands for so much.
III. DISPROPORTIONATE Loss IN AMERICAN
AND SCANDINAVIAN LAW
I feel neither obliged nor inclined to re-defend my thesis
(been there, done that), but I will elaborate on some observa-
tions with respect to limiting compensation for foreseeable, yet
disproportionate loss. I find these worth re-examining, not only
because I suspect disproportionate loss was a subject close to
Allan Farnsworth's heart, but also because I know (on the basis
of my own part-time experience as an arbitrator) that the sub-
ject remains relevant within the CISG Convention context.
By the time I reached this particular sub-topic in my thesis,
I had come to the hardly controversial conclusion that tradi-
tional liability limitations had been judged insufficient in both
American and Scandinavian law, particularly regarding liabil-
ity for consequential loss. The Hadley precedent and progeny
(and Scandinavian analogues), which focus mainly on foresee-
ability, hardly solve the larger Hadley problem. 35 Consider, for
example, this variation:
Night Light.36 Retail dealer S contracts to sell farmer B a tractor
with lights. S knows B needs the lights to harvest at night. Deliv-
ery of the lights is delayed and, since no substitute is available, B
is unable to use the tractor at night. He then sues S for (substan-
tial) profits lost.
34 Some years ago, the Japanese Ministry of Education funded a project de-
signed to clarify the detailed structures of legal knowledge in the field of contract
law as embodied in the CISG, to describe the CISG in terms of "logical formalism,"
to apply this formalism in representing the CISG, and to implement a legal expert
system to support automated reasoning. See Harry Flechtner, Transcript of a
Workshop on the Sales Convention, 18 J. L. & COMM. 191, 195 (1999); Hajime
Yoshino, Development of Fuzzy Legal Expert System (FLES) for CISG, http://www.
meijigakuin.ac.jp/-yoshino/documents/thesis/200le-l.pdf (last visited Mar. 11,
2007) (description of the resulting "fuzzy" expert system).
35 Accord LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 172 (discussing Hadley progeny).
36 Patterned after Lamkins v. Int'l Harvester Co., 182 S.W.2d 203 (Ark. 1944).
The facts in my Night Light paradigm are a bit closer to Lamkins than those in
Illustration 18 to § 351(3) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. See infra
note 44.
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Farmer B's loss was clearly "foreseeable" (perhaps even fore-
seen) by S at the time of contracting, but our sense of justice
may lead us down other roads. In American law, cases like
Night Light were originally subsumed under the notion of "tacit
agreement," which denied recovery for (foreseeable) conse-
quential loss - where the damages "are so large as to be out of
proportion to the consideration agreed"37 - unless plaintiff
proved that defendant "at the time of the contract tacitly con-
sented to be bound to more than ordinary damages in case of
default on his part,"38 i.e., so that "he accepts the contract with
the special condition attached to it." 39
American scholars subsequently exposed the doctrinal
weakness of tacit agreement, 40 but the Night Light conundrum
did not go away; indeed, American judges remained reluctant to
hold a promisor liable for (foreseeable) consequences in an
amount greatly disproportionate to the consideration re-
ceived.41 Some courts cloaked their reluctance by covertly twist-
ing Hadley, so that what was actually foreseeable became
"unforeseeable."42 Other courts rendered foreseeable (compen-
sable) losses "unforeseeable" (and thus non-compensable) by
"particularly rigorous" application of the doctrine of certainty, 43
i.e., by covertly characterizing what was actually certain as
"uncertain."
Then, in 1979, Allan Farnsworth, at the helm as Reporter
of the Second American Restatement of Contracts,44 added a
new liability-limiter to the traditional list, one designed to help
American courts "get real" in their handling of disproportionate
loss. This new rule in § 351(3) provides:
A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recov-
ery for loss of profits, by allowing recovery only for loss incurred
37 Hooks Smelting Co. v. Planters' Compress Co., 79 S.W. 1052, 1056 (Ark.
1904) (emphasis added); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, at 808.
38 Lamkins, 182 S.W.2d at 205.
39 Id.
40 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, at 794, 808; see also IVERSEN, supra note 23
(regarding criticism of the corresponding Danish conception).
41 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, at 808.
42 Id. at 809.
43 Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 27 (regarding certainty as a lia-
bility limiter).
44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 351(3) (1981).
7
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in reliance, or otherwise if it concludes that in the circumstances
justice so requires in order to avoid disproportionate
compensation.
Though it might rhyme with older tacit agreement philosophy,
the new, overtly open-ended standard in § 351(3) seems to cut
deeply into conventional (full compensation) contract wisdom.
Not only does the provision authorize courts to deny compensa-
tion for (foreseeable) loss of profits; it subjects "expectation pro-
tection" as such to discretionary limitation by the competent
court.
Then again, the principle so broadly restated in § 351(3)
was designed mainly as a "safety-valve," for the exceptional
(one-off) case. 45 And then there's the interesting (academic)
question of the "source of the source." In 1989 I found so little
direct support in American judge-made law for this (then new)
provision that I came to view § 351(3) as Allan Farnsworth's
statement (not restatement) of American law,46 an indication of
the "direction" he hoped American judges might take.47
These reservations notwithstanding, I did not question the
Restatement's significance as an important secondary source, 48
nor did I doubt the wisdom underlying § 351(3), which at least
serves to codify the dissatisfaction expressed in some American
quarters with respect to covert limitations of consequential lia-
bility.49 When flexible new standards supplant outworn formal
rules,50 we can talk more openly about reasonableness and eq-
uity,51 about all relevant operative facts. But I still think
§ 351(3) stands for wishful thinking. The American Restate-
45 See id. cmt. f ("unusual instances").
46 See LoOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 189 nn.530-38.
47 Cf. Mortimer N.S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of
America, 54 Am. J. COMP. L. 67, 76 (2006) ("The Restatements seek to anticipate
the direction in which the law is 'tending' and to assist this development by build-
ing on previously established principles.").
48 See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at 83-89 (regarding secondary
sources in American law).
49 See Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 1208-10; see also supra text accompanying
note 41.
50 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Some Prefatory Remarks: From Rules to Stan-
dards, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 634, 634 (1982).
51 When "justice so requires" a rule like § 351(3) might take up some of the
"slack" left after the merger of (Common) Law and Equity. I remain grateful to
Professor Charles Knapp (then at NYU, now at Hastings) for this observation.
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ment (still) does not carry the force of statutory law, and there
are still relatively few precedents which expressly support the
rule in § 351(3).52 Indeed, some prominent authorities - like the
American Law Commissioners - have expressly refused to follow
the Restatement's progressive lead.5 3
In the next step in my comparative analysis, I emphasized
that flexibility and realism have long been the pragmatic busi-
ness of Scandinavian courts. When, for example, the Danish Li-
ability Act was passed in 1984,54 the Danish judiciary had long-
since judged the traditional (German-inspired) Danish doctrine
of adekvans (adequate loss) 5 5 to be inadequate (as a conse-
quential liability limitation), though § 24 of the Act did serve to
put a clear legislative stamp of approval on the discretionary
safety valve which the Danish judges had already made and
used in their courts:56
Liability may be reduced or eliminated when the imposition of
same would be unreasonably burdensome or when other excep-
tional circumstances make such reduction or elimination reasona-
ble. In making this decision attention shall be given to the extent
of the injury, the nature of the liability, the injuring party's situa-
tion,57 the injured party's interests, existing insurance, 58 and
other circumstances. 59
52 In the 4th edition of CONTRACTS, supra note 6, Farnsworth cites two post-
Restatement (Second) precedents to support the view that § 351(3) is an "invita-
tion [American] courts have begun to accept." See id. at 809, n.10.
53 Deleting a proposed (1998) addition to Section 2B-707 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code which would have denied "consequential damages that are unreason-
ably disproportionate to the risk assumed under the contract by the party in
breach," the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws noted
that § 351(3) "is not universally adopted. Also, it is a permissive, rather than
mandatory limitation." See The Impact of Article 2b, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/
institutes/bclt/events/ucc2b/draft/707.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
54 Lov om erstatningsansvar, Law nr. 228 of 23 May 1984. Cf Skadestdnd-
slagen, 6:2 (the comparable Swedish rule).
55 See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
56 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 191-94; see also Lookofsky, supra note 20
(regarding Danish "judge-made" law).
57 In Danish, forhold refers not only to the "economic situation" of the
tortfeasor/promisor, but also to the degree which he or she was "at fault."
58 Covering either party.
59 This is my translation.
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We see clear and striking similarities between this Danish pro-
vision and § 353(1) of the American Restatement,60 but we also
find significant differences. As already noted, the Danish limi-
tation represents a binding codification of real (as opposed to
hoped-for) judge-made law.6 1 It is also significant that the Dan-
ish safety valve represents a general damages limitation which
applies in all cases - i.e., as a potential limitation of both con-
tractual and delictual/tort liability - whenever Danish law
applies.62
This leads to another distinction worth emphasizing. The
prominence of the phrase unreasonably burdensome indicates
that the main factor in determining whether liability should be
reduced in accordance with § 24 is the relationship between the
size of the loss suffered by the party injured (by tort or breach)
and the economic situation of the defendant (tortfeasor or prom-
isor), including whether that defendant is covered by insurance
or not. 63 In my thesis, I took this proportionality factor and
supporting case law6 4 as evidence to support the proposition
that Scandinavian courts and legislators sometimes seem a bit
more willing to "socialize" private law (invade the privacy of
classical contract), more willing to engage in paternalism (or
"episodic altruism"6 5). When, for example, the breaching prom-
isor is a marginal merchant (an uninsured little guy or small
business with a big problem, perhaps threatening his/its eco-
60 Both rules represent "caps" on the measure of liability which would other-
wise follow from general rules, just as both were intended mainly to apply in the
exceptional or unusual case. Both rules also serve to provide new overt replace-
ments for outworn "covert" techniques.
61 That observation seems significant when evaluating whether American dis-
proportionate loss doctrine might be available as a "supplement" to Article 74 of
the CISG context. See generally infra Part V.
62 Though the travaux prdparatoires advocate "particular restraint" when ap-
plying the provision in contractual contexts. Cf. ANDERSEN & LoOKOFSKY, supra
note 11, ch. 5.5k. My reference to "Danish law" includes the CISG (which Den-
mark has ratified); whether the CISG "pre-empts" § 24 of the Act is a separate
issue. See infra Part IV.
63 See Commentary, Erstatningsansvarsloven, § 24 in KARNovs LOVSAMLING,
available at www.thomson.dk.
64 See, e.g., LoOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 193-94 ("Roof Fire" paradigm based
on the Danish Supreme Court decision reported in UGESKRIFT FOR RETSVeSEN
1984, p. 23).
65 Id. at 195-96 (borrowing this phrase from CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE 109 (1981)).
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nomic viability),66 neither existing precedents nor the sanctity
of the promise principle can "force" a Scandinavian judge to
reach what he or she would consider an unjust or unreasonable
result.67
This provides an example of what I have described as the
spirit of Scandinavian Realism:6 8 justice breaks the rules when
the rules would break with justice. 69 Faced with a multitude of
competing considerations in a complex case, the Scandinavian
judge need not wend his/her way to the right decision by concep-
tual reasoning alone; axiomatic legal logic does not always lead
to an inevitable result. Instead, the judge, having taken ac-
count of all relevant operative facts, starts with the result, and
then "reasons backwards," using applicable legal logic to test the
correctness of that decision. 70
In this realistic/pragmatic environment, the result (out-
come for the parties) is far more important than ratio, let alone
the possible precedent. 71 So the main thing for a Danish judge
(or arbitrator) faced with a disproportionate contract claim is to
cap the damages, not the "how to" (the ratio) - i.e., by overt ref-
erence to § 24 or, as is more likely, by more covert, less overtly
paternalistic means (e.g., by reference to a convenient adequate
loss prong, 72 and/or by "rigorous application" of the certainty re-
quirement), for even Scandinavian judges sometimes succumb
to that kind of thing.73
66 Id. at 191.
67 This "rule of reasonableness" - which, in contractual contexts, can serve to
"cap" a promisee's (enforceable) expectation interest - is clearly "akin" to the
(in)famous Scandinavian General Clause (§ 36 of the Contracts Act), which autho-
rizes courts (and arbitrators) to deny enforcement of any unreasonable contract or
clause. See Joseph Lookofsky, The Limits of Commercial Contract Freedom: Under
the UNIDROIT "Restatement" and Danish Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 485, 485-508
(1998), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky2.html (re-
garding the latter rule).
68 Accord Heikki Pihlajamiki, Against Metaphysics in Law: The Historical
Background of American and Scandinavian Legal Realism Compared, 52 AM. J.
COMP. L. 469 (2004).
69 Id. at 192.
70 Id. at 191-92.
71 See generally Lookofsky, supra note 20.
72 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
73 See, e.g., Lookofsky, supra note 67, at 501 (in Denmark, even a commercial
contract can be "policed" for fairness, if need be by using our "General Clause," but
in commercial cases, our courts continue to give preference to more traditional,
judge-made rules of law). See also IVERSEN, supra note 23, at 537 (regarding recov-
11
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Having summed up my comparative framework, I can now
move on to the international context.
IV. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN CISG CONTEXT
The remedial scheme of the CISG Convention is designed to
put an injured promisee in the position she would have enjoyed
"but for" the breach, thus protecting that party's expectation in-
terest,74 inter alia, by providing a monetary substitute for
promised performance. Under Article 74, the general CISG rule
which (by default, absent contrary agreement) measures liabil-
ity for breach, damages are "equal to the loss, including loss of
profit, suffered as a consequence of the breach."75
This is, however, only the starting point. The Convention,
while generally "not concerned" with refusing enforcement alto-
gether (i.e., validity defenses governed by domestic law),76 does
accept the conventional wisdom of not going too far in the direc-
tion of enforcement, 77 in particular by limiting damages to the
loss which the breaching party "foresaw or ought to have fore-
seen ... as a possible consequence of the breach.178
Article 74 represents the general Convention rule on dam-
ages, as it protects against all (foreseeable) loss caused by the
breach, including (e.g.) direct loss suffered by a buyer who will
not or cannot avoid. 79 But Article 74 is most significant regard-
ing indirect (consequential) loss, including lost profits and other
ery of lost profits (driftstab), concluding that Danish judges, exercising wide discre-
tion, often reduce damage claims (to low levels), but without explaining why); supra
text accompanying notes 42-43 (regarding covert liability limitations in American
law).
74 The broadly formulated rule in Article 74 has been read by an American
court to include damages measured by the "reliance interest" as well. See infra
note 91 (regarding the Delchi case).
75 See generally LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, § 6.15; see also Djakhongir Saidov,
Causation in Damages: The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, the Prin-
ciples of European Contract Law, in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 225 (Pace Int'l L. Rev. ed., 2006).
76 See generally id. § 2.6 (regarding CISG Article 4).
77 Cf. supra text accompanying note 15.
78 See CISG, supra note 2, art. 74.
79 See id. arts. 75-76 (regarding damages in avoidance situations). Also "inci-
dental" damages (e.g., additional costs incurred after the breach in a reasonable
attempt to avoid loss) are easily subsumed under the Article 74 rule.
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purely economic loss, 8 0 as well as physical damage to
property.81
With the notion of foreseeability expressly at its core, Arti-
cle 74 seems similar to both Hadley and the corresponding
prong in Scandinavian domestic (adxkvans) doctrine,8 2 though
such similarities do not provide justification for American or
Scandinavian courts to interpret CISG Article 74 in a parochial
way, i.e. as if Article 74 and Hadley (or its Scandinavian ana-
logue) were one and the same.8 3 In accordance with Hadley, for
example, but in contrast with Scandinavian domestic law, the
Convention's foreseeability standard is to be evaluated solely on
the basis of information available to the breaching party at the
time of the conclusion (making) of the contract, in the light of
the facts and matters which that party then knew or should
have known.8 4
Article 74 requires only that the loss in question be foresee-
able (as opposed to actually foreseen)8 5 by the defendant as a
80 See, e.g., Handelsgericht [HG] [Commercial Court], ZIrich No. HG 95 0347,
Feb. 5, 1997 (Switz.), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/970205sl.
html (buyer awarded damages for loss of profit and other consequential damages
for losses suffered due to exchange rate fluctuation between US dollars (currency
of payment) and German marks).
81 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, § 2.6 (regarding Article 5 and consequential
loss which takes the form of damage to property, other than the goods themselves).
82 See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
83 As a U.S. Federal court did in the Delchi case. See infra text accompanying
note 91. See also LoOKOFSKY, supra note 3, § 2.9 (regarding the goal of uniform
CISG interpretation).
84 The underlying idea is that the parties, at that point in time, should be able
to calculate the risks and potential liability they assume by agreement. See Ober-
landesgericht, [OLG] [Provincial Court of Appeals] K61n, 22 U 4/96, May 21, 1996
(F.R.G.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960521gl.html (seller aware
buyer was car dealer at time of conclusion of contract; damages paid by buyer to its
customer therefore foreseeable loss under Art. 74). The scope of CISG responsibil-
ity is not extended if the promisor (e.g. seller) - after the conclusion of the con-
tract, but before the breach - learns of circumstances which indicate a risk of
extraordinary loss; in this respect the extent of liability under Article 74 may differ
from domestic systems where liability is based on fault. See Bundesgerichtshof
[BGH] [Federal Supreme Court), VIII ZR 210/78, Oct. 24, 1979 (F.R.G.), available
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edulcisg/wais/db/cases2/791024gl.html.
85 See, e.g., E.K., L. und A. v. F., Bundesgericht [BGer] [Supreme Court], 1.
Zivilabteilung, 4C.179/1998/odi, Oct. 28, 1998 (Switz.), available at http://cisgw3.
law.pace.edu/cases/981028sl.html (buyer's loss of clientele was foreseeable conse-
quence of breach (non-conforming delivery), since buyer was wholesale dealer in
sensitive market with no alternative by which to meet its obligations to its buyers).
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"possible consequence" of breach.8 6 Depending on the circum-
stances, however, compensation for even foreseeable loss may
be denied or reduced by reference to the Convention's mitiga-
tion requirement (Article 77)87 and/or by relevant evidentiary
standards which always require some degree of "certainty."88 In
American courts, for example, the standards of proof applicable
to a lost profits claim lie well beyond the usual burdens of per-
suasion, but due to a relaxation of the certainty requirement,
only "reasonable certainty" is now required.8 9 Outside the Com-
mon law realm, lost profits may be more difficult to prove, not
only because some courts insist on greater certainty, but also
because Scandinavian (or Civilian) plaintiffs sometimes seem
less willing (than Americans) to produce confidential business
accounts in court. 90
In the Delchi case, decided by a U.S. Federal Court in
1994,91 an Italian buyer ordered 10,800 compressors from a
86 Compare FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.14 (American law; foreseeable as
probable), with The Heron 11 (1969) 3 All E.R. 686, 708 (English law; liable to
result, serious possibility or real danger).
87 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, § 6.17 (regarding Article 77).
88 Compare Hans Stoll & Georg Gruber in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVEN-
TION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 758-59 (Schlechtriem &
Schwenzer eds., 2005) ("CISG does not lay down what degree of probability... [a]
judge should be convinced profit would actually have been made"), with Hans Stoll
in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
(CISG) 563 (Schlechtriem ed., 1998) (citing, in the previous edition of that same
commentary, the relevance of the general law of evidence of lex fori), and LOOKOF-
SKY, supra note 3, at 120. See also UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL CONTRACTS, Art. 7.4.3 (requiring (1) only "reasonable certainty," and
allowing (2) compensation for "value lost of chance" - a concept persuasively sup-
ported for application in the CISG context by Saidov, supra note 27, at 51, but
flatly rejected by Stoll & Gruber).
89 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.15. Evidence (reasonably) certain and
sufficient to convince an American court was, for example, provided by the Italian
plaintiff in Delchi. See infra text accompanying notes 91-94.
90 See Jan Hellner, Consequential Loss and Exemption Clauses, 1 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 13, 24 (1981). Reacting to a similar passage in my thesis, supra note
1, Professor Iversen rightly highlights the fact that it can be very expensive to hire
accountants to "document" lost profits, and that an injured promisee will only be
inclined to do that when the case is correspondingly "big" (and the potential dam-
ages recovery sufficiently large). See IVERSEN, supra note 23, at 172.
91 Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp., No. 88-CV-1078, 1994 WL 495787
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir.
1995); see also Eric Schneider, Consequential Damages in the International Sale of
Goods: Analysis of Two Decisions, 16 J. Bus. L. 615 (2005) (addressing the Delchi
case).
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seller/manufacturer in Maryland. At the time of contracting,
the buyer advised that the compressors were intended for use in
the production of a particular line of portable air-conditioners to
be manufactured by the buyer. When the seller failed to deliver
goods which conformed to the contract, the buyer sued to re-
cover damages for various losses incurred as a result of the
breach. Noting that CISG Article 74 seeks to provide the in-
jured party with the benefit of the bargain, so as to protect that
party's expectation interest, the court awarded the buyer more
than one million dollars in compensation, including consequent-
ial damages for the following items of foreseeable loss: damages
incurred as a result of buyer's (failed, but reasonable) attempts
to remedy the non-conformity in seller's compressors, 92 ex-
penses reasonably incurred in mitigation of the loss, 93 costs in-
curred for handling and storage of the non-conforming
compressors, as well as lost profit resulting from a diminished
volume of sales. 94 It would have been preferable if the Delchi
court had supported its Article 74 conclusions by referring to
(less parochial) secondary sources, 95 but better judicial scholar-
ship would hardly have led to a different decision or a better
result.
A special consequential question involves the relationship
between Article 74 and the so-called "American rule." Under
American rules of procedure (but contrary to the lex fori in Eu-
rope and elsewhere), the losing party in an American litigation
is generally not required to reimburse the winning party for its
lawyers' fees. 96 In breach of (sales) contract cases, this might
look like an exception to the (substantive) principle of full ex-
92 Costs that would not have been incurred "but for" the breach.
93 See generally LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, § 6.17 (regarding Article 77).
94 The buyer in Delchi was also awarded pre-judgment interest at the U.S.
Treasury bill rate. Delchi, 1994 WL 495787. A claim for expenses related to the
anticipated cost of production was denied, but to this extent the case was reversed
and remanded. Delchi, 71 F.3d at 1030. See also LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, § 6.18
(regarding Article 78).
95 Such as CISG scholarly opinion. See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, § 6.15 n.164
(regarding this aspect of Delchi); Schneider, supra note 91 (criticizing the provin-
cialism of the Delchi court).
96 As in Europe, the losing party in an American litigation is usually required
to pay the successful party's "costs" (e.g. fees paid to the court), but in the U.S.
such costs do not generally include attorneys' fees. The principle has been modi-
fied in certain instances by "fee shifting" statutes, see infra note 98, but no-fee-
shifting is still the general American rule. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
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pectation-interest protection for all foreseeable loss which flows
from the breach, 97 but this very general American rule (which
applies in virtually all U.S. civil cases, i.e. not just in contract
cases, but in tort cases as well)98 is best characterized as proce-
dural.9 9 For this reason, and since the U.S. Supreme Court,
when recognizing limited statutory exceptions to the (American,
no-fee-shifting) rule, has required clear evidence of legislative
(fee-shifting) intent, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Zapata rightly
- albeit controversially - held that Article 74 does not provide
authority for a special (CISG) exception to the general Ameri-
can rule.100
In other words, when the United States (in 1986, as one of
the first CISG Contracting States) expressly opted into the Con-
vention's remedial scheme, including full expectation damages
for breach, it did not impliedly "opt out" of their generally appli-
cable domestic rule which denies recovery of attorneys' fees as
part of a successful plaintiffs damages, since that "matter" is
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.
Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
97 Accord FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.8; see also supra text accompanying
note 6 (important qualification to expectation).
98 See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Shift Happens: Pressure on Foreign Attorney-Fee
Paradigms from Class Actions, 13 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 125 (2003) (regarding
exceptions to the fee-shifting rule).
99 As opposed to substantive. Domestic rules which determine whether (or
under what circumstances) lawyers' fees are to be "shifted" (born by the losing
party) are regarded as procedural rules in many CISG jurisdictions. See generally
Harry M. Flechtner, Recovering Attorneys' Fees as Damages under the U.N. Sales
Convention: A Case Study on the New International Commercial Practice and the
Role of Case Law in CISG Jurisprudence, with Comments on Zapata Hermanos v.
Hearthside Baking, 22 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 121 (2002), available at http://www.
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisglbiblio/flechtner4.html#iv.
100 Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385
(7th Cir. 2002), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/021119
ul.html. See also Harry Flechtner & Joseph Lookofsky, Viva Zapata! American
Procedure and CISG Substance in a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal, 7 VINDOBONA J.
INT'L COM. L. & ARB. 93 (2003), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg
biblio/flechtner5.html. But see John Felemegas, An Interpretation of Article 74
CISG by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 15 PACE INT'L L. REV. 91 (2003), availa-
ble at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/felemegas4.html. On June 16, 2003,
the U.S. Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs/Zapata's petition for certiorari (third
instance review). Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 540
U.S. 1068 (2003).
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neither "governed" nor "settled" by the CISG.1° 1 So, "case
closed" on that (consequential) point, however hard some CISG
commentators may continue to spin Article 74 in a more expan-
sive (Article 7) direction. 10 2
V. DISPROPORTIONATE Loss IN CISG CONTEXT
All this makes for a complex consequential picture (at least
as complex as under domestic law), but the CISG story does not
end even here. If I had more time and space, I might, for exam-
ple, argue that decisions which award or deny compensation for
consequential loss in the CISG context are also affected by a
variety of other factors, similar to those in my domestic concep-
tual catalogue (the complex mixture of elements which I fac-
tored into my comparative consequential equation).' 0 3
Granted, a proposition like that would be difficult to docu-
ment (even for a younger researcher with time and pages to
burn), in part because judges don't always tell the whole story
(reveal the real ratios underlying difficult decisions), 10 4 just as
arbitrators everywhere report even less. In 1989 there was sim-
ply no CISG case law to discuss;10 5 today we have lots of re-
ported CISG decisions,' 0 including some about lost profits (and
101 On this particular point, Harry Flechtner and I took issue with a "techni-
cality" in Judge Posner's opinion in Zapata. See generally Flechtner & Lookofsky,
supra note 100.
102 Cf. Bruno Zeller, Interpretation of Article 74 - Zapata Hermanos v. Heath-
side Baking - Where Next?, 1 NORDIC J. COMM. L. (2004), available at http://www.
njcl.fi/l_2004/commentaryl.pdf. In his commentary on Article 7, Peter Schlech-
triem argues that Article 74, second sentence, represents a "principle of risk attri-
bution" which, in his view, applies to "costs of litigation," thus (contra Zapata)
"suspending" domestic rules qualified as procedural matters." See COMMENTARY,
supra note 88, at 104-05 n.58; but see Stoll & Gruber, supra note 88, at 757 n.88
(who in their commentary on Article 74 in the same COMMENTARY, but without
citing Schlechtriem or his "risk principle," accept both the substance/procedure dis-
tinction as well as the lawyers' fees holding in the Zapata decision).
103 See supra text accompanying note 32. One consequential damages scenario
I might be inclined to dissect in this connection would be the German Supreme
Court's decision of 24 March 1999 (Vine Wax). Bundesgerichtshof [BGH [Federal
Supreme Court], VIII ZR 121/98, Mar. 24, 1999 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.
cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/990324gl.html.
104 See generally Lookofsky, supra note 20 (regarding the extremely opaque
nature of Danish judicial decisions). See also supra note 73.
105 The Convention first took effect in 1988. See LoOKOFSKY, supra note 3, at 1.
106 See, e.g., the decisions at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html.
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other indirect lOSS), 10 7 but much of this case law remains une-
ven and opaque.108 Quite apart from the fact that a given CISG
precedent can only bind (lower) courts within that judgment-
rendering jurisdiction, 10 9 CISG consequential cases are often
one-off, because (as Farnsworth put it) so "much depends on the
particular circumstances of the case and the judicial philosophy
of the court,"110 because judges and arbitrators wield "covert
tools,"111 and (as I maintained in my thesis) because the whole
consequential equation is so highly complex. 112
I would, however, now like to address a particularly diffi-
cult CISG point: the possible relevance of domestic limitations
designed to prevent disproportionate compensation. Consider
this hypothetical:
Seller's Shaft: The crankshaft in B's Dutch mill breaks. Danish
merchant S, who knows B has no other shaft, agrees to build B a
new one (using the old shaft as a model). S then negligently de-
lays manufacture and delivery of the new shaft. As a result, the
107 See, e.g., http://www.unilex.info/ (revealing, as of 24 July 2006, 17 decisions
relating to Art. 74 and "lost profits").
108 As summarized in the UNCITRAL Case Digest of Article 74 (conveniently
available, with active case-links, at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/anno-art-
74.html#forsee), some decisions have found that the breaching party could not
have foreseen the following losses: rental of machinery by buyer's sub-buyer; the
processing of goods in a different country following late delivery; exceptionally
large payments to freight forwarder; attorney's fees in dispute with freight for-
warder; the cost of resurfacing grinding machine where cost exceeded price of wire
to be ground; lost profits where breaching seller did not know terms of contract
with sub-buyer; inspection of the goods would take place in importing country
rather than exporting country. On the other hand, several decisions have explic-
itly found that claimed damages were foreseeable. One such decision states that
the seller of a good to a retail buyer should foresee that the buyer would resell the
good, while an arbitration tribunal found that the breaching seller could have fore-
seen the buyer's losses because they had corresponded extensively on supply
problems; another decision concluded that a breaching buyer could foresee that an
aggrieved seller of fungible goods would lose its typical profit margin; a majority of
another court awarded ten per cent of the price as damages to a seller who had
manufactured the cutlery to the special order of the buyer (and that majority noted
that a breaching buyer could expect that sum).
109 See generally Joseph Lookofsky, Digesting CISG Case Law: How Much Re-
gard Should We Have?, 8 VINDOBONA J. INT'L COM. L. & ARB. 181, 183 (2004),
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky9.html (regarding
the (at best "persuasive") nature of CISG precedents).
110 FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, at 802 (speaking of American domestic law).
111 Id. at 808-09.
112 See supra text accompanying note 32. See generally LOOKOFSKY, supra note
1, pt. 5.
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reopening of the mill is delayed, and B suffers (huge) lost profits,
for which he demands compensation from S.
These days, this is a CISG contract by default. 113 That makes S
liable for late delivery on a no-fault basis, 114 and given the
causal connection between breach and loss,115 the big Seller's
Shaft question is the same as in Hadley: just how much should
the injured party (B) get? Assuming B can provide sufficiently
certain evidence of lost profits, 116 does the fact that those losses
were clearly foreseeable (at the time of contracting) mean that
full compensation is a foregone conclusion?
I have my (Scandinavian) doubts, especially if B's loss has
swelled to a disproportionate size, say to one or two hundred
times the price of the shaft; indeed, if S is a small merchant,
awarding that kind of disproportionate compensation might
even make S go belly-up. 1 7 But just as some found it difficult
to predict (or accept) the ultimate outcome in Zapata,118 it
seems hard to predict how a given judge or arbitrator, with a
given consequential philosophy, 119 might resolve Seller's Shaft.
I see at least four viable approaches: (1) obey the black let-
ter of Article 74 and compensate B for the whole (certain, fore-
seeable) loss; (2) use covert tools to characterize part of the
(foreseeable) loss as "unforeseeable" under Article 74,120 per-
haps also emphasizing relevant evidenciary standards which
require that certain losses be proved with particular cer-
tainty;121 (3) characterize the "matter" (i.e., the sub-issue of lia-
113 Because the parties have their respective businesses in Contracting States
(Article 1), because it is a "sale" with S supplying the materials (Article 3), and
because there is no evidence the parties have contracted out (Article 6).
114 S would be liable even if his breach had not been negligent. Compare
LoOKOFSKY, supra note 3, § 6.14 (regarding breach as the basis of CISG liability),
with supra text accompanying note 11 (regarding the breach in Hadley).
115 The paradigm indicates that B's loss is the "result" (consequence) of the
breach.
116 For example: because the mill is old and reliable, with a consistently profit-
able track record. That would certainly be sufficiently "certain" for some. Cf supra
note 88.
117 This illustrates that a given loss can be "disproportionate" in at least two
respects. See also supra text accompanying note 63.
118 See supra note 102.
119 Cf. FARNSWORTH, supra note 19.
120 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.17 (regarding the use of this covert
technique in American domestic law).
121 See supra text accompanying note 88.
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bility for disproportionate loss) as "governed but not expressly
settled" by the Convention, 122 and then locate a CISG "general
principle" to settle it; (4) supplement Article 74 with domestic
(Danish or Dutch) rules to prevent disproportionate
compensation. 123
Decision makers with high regard for CISG black letters
may find it easiest to hold the promisor (S) liable for all the
(clearly foreseeable) consequences (1). After all, the breach
(failure to deliver) provides a clear-cut basis for protecting B's
expectation, 124 just as Article 74 defines (with near-mathemati-
cal precision) the measure of CISG damages as being "equal to
the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a
consequence of the breach."125 And while such damages may
not exceed foreseeable loss, 126 the Convention provides no (ex-
press) limitation for disproportionate loss. Indeed, had such a
limitation been proposed in Vienna, I doubt many delegates
would have been inclined to support it,127 let alone include a
"proportionality principle" in a larger Global Code. 128
122 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, § 2.11 (regarding Article 7(2)).
123 See supra text accompanying notes 56-59 (regarding the Danish rule); cf.
Dutch Civil Code, Art. 109:
1) The court may reduce a legal obligation to pay damages if a full award
of damages would lead to clearly unacceptable results in the given circum-
stances, including the nature of the liability, the existing juridical (legal)
relationship between the parties and their financial resources.
(2) The reduction may not be made if it reduces the amount below that for
which the obligor has covered his liability by insurance or was obliged to
do so.
(3) Any stipulation in breach of paragraph 1 is a nullity.
Id.
124 See supra text accompanying note 114.
125 CISG, supra note 2, art. 74 (emphasis added).
126 See id.
127 Having perused some unwieldy CISG legislative history, see generally
LoOKOFSKY, supra note 3, § 2.8, I could find no evidence of such a proposal. Judg-
ing by the PECL "restatement" (see PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (Ole
Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000) Art. 9:502 (General Measure of Damages) and
Art. 9:503 (Foreseeability)), most Europeans would not have favored such a CISG
limitation; nor would most Americans. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
128 See id. (regarding American and European reluctance in this context). For
these and other reasons, I would hardly expect the "proportionality principle" to
become part of a "Global Commercial Code" (i.e., if such an unwieldy creature ever
came to be). But see Ole Lando, CISG and Its Followers: A Proposal to Adopt Some
International Principles of Contract Law, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 379, 398 (2005).
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On the basis of some highly respected (recently updated)
German CISG commentary, I am tempted to suggest that this
all-foreseeable-loss option (1) accords with what German com-
mentators often call the "prevailing [German] view," since this
commentary seems to reject any tampering with "full [CISGI
compensation" for all foreseeable loss, 129 provided that such
losses are proved with high "certainty" (a proviso which, for
those commentators, rules out any damages to compensate "lost
chance"). 130 I am not sure why my German colleagues have
lined up this rather rigorous way, but it may be significant that
the Convention liability scheme represents a compromise be-
tween Civil and Common law views, and that part of that com-
promise was the decision to replace the key Civilian conception
of fault as the general basis of liability for breach with no-fault
liability, as in Common law. 131 That particular decision might
have been (too) hard for German jurists to swallow, had it not
been for (a) the foreseeable loss limitation in Article 74, which -
viewed from a German domestic perspective - represents a
counterbalancing step in the other (less liability) direction, 32
and (b) a Convention text which (since it says nothing about
how much "certainty" is required) allows German courts to
draw their own (rigorous) conclusions as to that. On that basis I
suspect that German commentators are loath to accept any
"modification" of the resulting allocation-of-risk "package;" they
are loath to rock the overall remedial compromise, the larger
liability boat. 133
I do not mean to suggest that all German jurists would pre-
fer option (1).134 Quite the contrary, I assume many courts and
arbitrators, in Germany and elsewhere, would be very reluctant
129 See generally Stoll & Gruber, supra note 88, at 746.
130 See id. at 759 (deciding bluntly (on the basis of German scholarly opinion):
"There is no compensation for loss of a mere chance of a profit."). Cf Saidov, supra
note 27, at 51 (a more elastic and persuasive position).
131 See Lookofsky, supra note 3, § 6.14. See also Stoll & Gruber, supra note 88,
at 750.
132 See Stoll & Gruber, supra note 88, at 764.
133 This may help explain Professor Schlechtriem's reluctance to accept the
very sensible result in Zapata. See supra text accompanying note 102.
134 Indeed, I am not even sure whether the authorities cited, infra note 148,
would prefer that option.
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to saddle S with all foreseeable losses caused by the breach,' 35
since (as Allan Farnsworth would have put it): it wouldn't be
just; it wouldn't be right.136 In fact, I suspect that many, if not
most decision makers-the perhaps prevailing (German) view
notwithstanding-would actually prefer to split this conse-
quential baby, 137 by using whatever tools might be available for
that liability-limiting task.
As regards the application of the limited assortment of lia-
bility-limiting tools at our disposal "inside the [CISG] box," it
seems to me that alternative (2) could lead to the "right" result,
but for the "wrong" reason(s), e.g., by twisting Article 74, so
what was (really) foreseeable becomes unforeseeable. 138 While
that (shaky methodology/ratio) does not disqualify this alterna-
tive, I think we might do well to consider the other available
alternatives first.
But I also have problems with CISG-toolbox alternative
(3).139 For even if we assume, arguendo, that the whole "mat-
ter" of disproportionate loss (i.e., both the loss/price and the
loss/status relationships) 140 is "governed" by the Convention, it
seems hardly possible to "settle" that matter satisfactorily by
applying an unwritten CISG general principle, such as "reason-
ableness" 141 or "risk attribution,"'142 let alone more domesti-
cally-inspired concepts like Hadley-animated "least-cost
avoidance"'143 or (say) one of eleven Scandinavian variations on
135 Accord FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, at 808 ("Some courts have balked at
reaching such a conclusion").
136 See id. (discussing a hypothetical Hadley variation much like my Seller's
Shaft: "It may not seem just.... Would it have been right?").
137 See LoOKOFSKY, supra note 1, at 218. For an example of a compromise CISG
consequential verdict, see Rechtbank van Koophandel [District Court], Hasselt,
No. AR 1849/94, May 2, 1995 (Belg.) (also reported in UNILEX) (court determined
Chilean seller's lost profits ex aequo et bono, taking into account probability of
cover sale at price significantly lower than price agreed in contract with Belgian
buyer).
138 Cf. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, at 808 (speaking of similar applications in
American domestic law).
139 See supra text accompanying note 122.
140 By "status," I refer shorthand to the defendant's "economic situation." Com-
pare supra text accompanying note 64, with supra text accompanying note 37 (fo-
cusing on the proportion between damages and "consideration").
141 See generally LoOKOFSKY, supra note 3, § 2.11.
142 Cf. Schlechtriem, supra note 102.
143 According to Judge Richard Posner, the "father" of the Law & Economics
discipline, the "animating principle" behind the American version of the Hadley
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a Hadley-like theme.144 Not only do I doubt whether such fore-
seeability qualifications are reconcilable with the black letter of
Article 74;145 I also fear that the various Article 7(2) principles
which different courts and arbitrators might select to help settle
this particular problem would vary with the size of each deci-
sion-maker's foot, thus hardly advancing the nobler cause of
"uniform" Convention interpretation. 146
That leaves alternative (4), which I (still) consider viable,
though I realize my thinking remains "outside the box;" 1 4 7 in-
deed, recent German doctrine has flatly ruled that alternative
(4) out.14 8 While I am aware of the drawbacks which accom-
pany this approach, I do not share the view that Article 74 nec-
essarily preempts the application of a Danish or Dutch statute
which empowers judges to limit disproportionate compensa-
tion. 149 Quite apart from the serious problems I associate with
the governed-but-not-settled alternative (3),150 I think that
(e.g.) the Danish statute, if applicable by virtue of choice-of-law
rules, 1 1  could supplement Article 74 as a relevant validity-re-
lated rule, a second cousin (so to speak) to rules with which the
CISG is simply "not concerned."1 52
rule is that the consequences of breach should be avoided by the party who can do
so at the "least cost." See Evra v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).
It would hardly require much (more) of a stretch if Posner, confronted with a large
CISG lost profits claim, were to read least-cost-avoidance into Article 74, as an
animating/underlying CISG general principle.
144 See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
145 However, I think that Schlechtriem's "risk principle" might be reconcilable
with the black letter of Article 74. See supra note 102.
146 See generally LOOKOFSKY, supra note 3, § 2.9.
147 Cf. Joseph Lookofsky, In Dubio Pro Conventione? Some Thoughts about
Opt-Outs, Computer Programs and Preemption Under the 1980 Vienna Sales Con-
vention (CISG), 13 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 263 (2003) (differentiated solutions to
the general Article 7(2) conundrum). See also Joseph Lookofsky, Impediments and
Hardship in International Sales: A Commentary on Catherine Kessedjian's "Com-
peting Approaches to Force Majeure and Hardship," 25 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 434
(2005).
148 See Stoll & Gruber, supra note 88, at 746 ("Mandatory rules of domestic law
that limit compensation for exceptionally high though foreseeable losses or grant
judges a right to reduce compensation may not be applied."). See also supra note 6
(citing the position taken by Magnus, rejecting Lookofsky's "questioning" view).
149 See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 137-46.
151 I.e., by virtue of the Private International Law rules of the forum.
152 I have elsewhere suggested (in Danish) that § 36 of the Danish Contracts
Act is "internationally mandatory." See JOSEPH LoOKOFSKY, INTERNATIONAL PRIVA-
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On the down side, I realize that many (even Danish) deci-
sion makers would be reluctant to go out on that domestic loss-
limiting limb, not only because the domestic legislator himself
has called for particular restraint, 15 3 but also because the
outside world is hardly ready for such overt contractual loss
limitation.154 Indeed, overt application of a rule like § 24 of the
Danish Liability Act would surely be too paternalistic an option
for those still faithful to the Contract Freedom Idol (though not
always the full measure of expectation protection which flows
from unflinching worship to that).1 55
My conclusion is thus that, in the real CISG world, all four
(4) alternatives remain viable. For Scandinavian decision mak-
ers, at least, the result in a case like Seller's Shaft will remain
far more important than the ratio,1 56 and that even goes for the
occasional irrational ratio, including (if need be) a decision
which "tests correct" by covert application of more traditional
CISG tools.157
That might sound "loose," but the hard fact is that the
CISG orchestra has no conductor, no one with authority to
make the national court-musicians march in (uniform) step.158
We have, in other words, no supranational Court of Justice with
authority to make even "preliminary rulings," for example, on
the relationship between the Convention and domestic limits on
compensation for disproportionate loss. 15 9 A related reality is
TRET PA FORMUERETTENS OMRADE 79 (3d ed. 2003). I think the same might be said
of § 24 of the Danish Liability Act. The Dutch disproportionate loss rule, see supra
note 67, is by its own terms "mandatory," which leaves open the question of
whether it is also "internationally mandatory."
153 See supra text accompanying note 62.
154 Accord ANDERSEN & LoOKOFSKY, supra note 11.
155 For an eloquent exposition on this point, see Lord Denning MR in George
Mitchell v. Finney Lock Seeds, (1983) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 272, 2 All E.R. 737 ("idol" of
freedom of contract "shattered" by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977). See also
supra note 67 (regarding § 36 of the Danish Contracts Act). For an English ab-
stract of recent Swedish case law on the correspondingly sensitive Swedish rule,
see http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Detail.aspx?r=12934&i=
1051092.
156 See supra text accompanying note 71.
157 See supra text accompanying note 70.
158 See Lookofsky, supra note 108; see also supra text accompanying note 34
(borrowing an image from Schlechtriem).
159 See generally JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY & KETILBJ0RN HERTZ, TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Ch. 2.2. (2d ed. 2003) (regarding ECJ
preliminary rulings in a different jurisdictional context); see also ECJ Case C-402/
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that most CISG cases are decided by arbitrators, and the ra-
tional results (awards) of arbitral tribunals are not subject to
judicial review (second-guessing). 160 The rules for reviewing
court decisions are of course different, but a given CISG deci-
sion can never be reviewed outside the jurisdiction con-
cerned, 16 1 except of course by academics (who fortunately
remain free to review and second-guess almost anything).
So, if you asked me about compensation for disproportion-
ate loss in the CISG context - for example, whether the Danes
impliedly opted out of their basic social justice conceptions
when they opted into the CISG162 - I would be inclined to leave
my options open. The global jury is still "out," and I would not
anticipate a definitive verdict on this issue, not in the "foresee-
able" future at least.
I know some might despair at the consequences all this
might have for uniform CISG interpretation, but let's remember
that Article 7(1) does not (indeed could not) demand fully uni-
form Convention interpretation or application, 163 not only be-
cause the judicial orchestra has no conductor, but also because
the Vienna drafters had no choice but to leave us with loose
ends like these. 64
Not to worry, the Scandinavian Realist might reassuringly
conclude, for loose ends and open-endedness do not make the
CISG a low-quality thing.165
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
When I started studying Law at NYU in 1967, Allan Farns-
worth was uptown at rival Columbia, writing about "Meaning"
03 (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lexLexUriServ/LexUri
Serv.do?uri=CELEX:62003J0402:EN:HTML.
160 The awards rendered by arbitral tribunals are rarely set aside, even if a
given national court would have reached a different result. See LOOKOFSKY &
HERTZ, supra note 159, Ch. 6.
161 See supra text accompanying note 109.
162 Cf supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
163 See generally LOOKOFSKY, supra note 109.
164 See Joseph Lookofsky, Loose Ends and Contorts in International Sales:
Problems in the Harmonization of Private Law Rules, 39 AM. J. CoMP. L. 403, 407
(1991), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky6.html.
165 Cf Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the Jurispru-
dence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 UNiv. COLO. L. REv. 541 (2000).
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in the Law of Contracts. 166 By 1981, when I received my first
Danish degree, Farnsworth had finished reporting the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts. Later, as I worked on my thesis, I
relied on that Restatement, as well as Farnsworth's own Con-
tracts,167 the modern Bible of the field.
In my thesis, as a prelude to what I (the hybrid-product of
two legal cultures) had come to see as the larger Hadley-conun-
drum, I quoted the following lines from Tennyson: 168
Mastering the lawless science of our law,
That codeless myriad of precedent,
That wilderness of single instances,
Thro' which a few, by wit or fortune led,
May beat a pathway out to wealth and fame.
Led to the science of law, "to do something which had a human
element,"169 Farnsworth beat a pathway to well-deserved fame;
his fine reputation preceded him wherever he went. When our
paths crossed in Copenhagen, to debate Consequential Dam-
ages, we certainly did not agree on everything, but I was cer-
tainly very happy that Allan Farnsworth was there. We will all
miss him.
166 E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939
(1967).
167 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 6.
168 Lord Tennyson, A., Aylmer's Field (1793).
169 "1 wanted to do something which had a human element in it as opposed to
an inanimate object," he told the Columbia Law School News in a 1968 interview.
See http://www.law.columbia.edu/media-inquiries/news-events/2005/february/
farnsworth#94413 (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
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